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STATUTES CITED 
§78-12-45 Action Barred in Another State Barred Here. 
"When a cause of action has arisen in another 
state or territory, or in a foreign country, 
and by the laws thereof an action thereon 
cannot be maintained against a person by 
reason of the lapse of time, an action shall 
not be maintained against him in this state, 
except in favor of one who has been a citizen 
of this state and who has held the cause of 
action from the time it accrued." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE 
APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, 
The Standard of Review in a case of statutory construction 
and/or a question of law requires that the reviewing court give no 
particular deference to the Trial Court7s interpretations. The 
same can be said for counsel/s interpretations1. 
The questions to be addressed are as follows: 
(1) Is the action brought by Plaintiff a contract or tort 
action and is the distinction of any relevance as it relates to the 
statute of limitations issue? 
1
 The fact the Defendant's counsel has, on one or more occasions, 
changed, modified or even reversed a position is of no importance. It is not 
relevant to the decision to be made by this Court. 
(2) What specific act or fact triggered the running of the 
statute of limitations? 
(3) Taking into consideration Issues 1 and 2 what is the 
appropriate state statute of limitations? and 
(4) Does the exclusion found in 78-12-45 UCA apply in this 
case? 
Analysis Issue I 
Plaintiff's Complaint sounds in a mixture of contract and 
tort. However, the prayer for relief seeks recovery of personal 
property, to-wit: Stock Certificate No. 2939 for 32,190 shares of 
Digitran stock. The Plaintiff delivered to the Defendant the 
certificate and an irrevocable stock power (Ex. 6) in the State of 
Louisiana. Plaintiff claims this was a pledge agreement. 
Defendant claims the transfer was outright and unconditional2. 
Whether this is an action in contract or tort need not be decided. 
The Trial Court erred in holding this case as one in contract. 
In Holm v. B & N Service, Inc., 661 P.2d 951 (Utah 1983) the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Neither the form of the proceeding nor the 
name applied to it can change the nature of 
the wrong or injury. It is the wrongful act 
which results in injury and damage which gives 
the right of action, and, if the injuries are 
to personal property, the statute fixes the 
time within which such an action must be 
brought, and the name of the action can have 
no effect upon the question of what statute 
controls. 
2
 For purposes of this portion of the brief the Defendant concedes for 
argument sake only that such a pledge relationship existed nonetheless any action 
seeking recovery or damages is barred by the Statute of Limitations as a matter 
of law. A significant portion of the prior brief and this brief are devoted to 
the Parole Evidence Rule and law surrounding the Statute of Frauds, however, the 
Defendant denies any such pledge relationship and has strongly resisted such 
below. 
See also Utah Poultry & Farmers Co-op v, Utah Ice and Storage. 187 
F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1951). In the Holm case the Court ruled that 
the three-year statute of limitation for the recovery of personal 
property was controlling regardless of whether or not the action 
was tort or contract. 
Analysis Issue 2 
Relative to the second issue, when Digitran issued its stock 
certificates to the Defendant in Texas on November 8, 1988, 
Plaintiff claims, in her affidavit, she was entitled to the return 
of her personal stock as of that date. (See the record pg. 203) 
The Statute of Limitations started to run as of November 8, 1988, 
when Plaintiff had the right to ask for and demand the return of 
her shares which she claims were held as security. The Statute of 
Limitations begins to run at the moment that a cause of action 
arises. Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corporation, 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 
1983). Holloway v. Butler. 662 S.W.2d 688 (Texas). 
The Defendant's transfer of the stock into his own name has 
nothing to do with the Plaintiff's right to reclaim her stock 
certificate and therefore the transfer of the stock on the 
corporate books is not an act which triggers the running of the 
statute of limitations. Plaintiff's interpretation of the 
commencement of the right of action clearly benefits Plaintiff's 
argument but is unsupported by case law. 
At the time of the delivery of the stock to Gary Briggs by 
Digitran in fulfillment of Digitran's agreement found in Exhibit 
No. 4, Plaintiff could have and should have, under her own theory, 
sought redelivery of her stock certificate situated in Texas. The 
Plaintiff's lack of diligence in seeking return of her stock does 
not affect the times for the commencement of the limitation period• 
Plaintiff's cause of action arose in Texas. 
Analysis Issue 3 
To address the third issue set forth above, on November 8, 
1988, the Defendant was a resident of Texas; the stock certificate 
which is the subject of this action was situated in Texas. 
Under the Defendant's theory, Plaintiff's cause of action 
arose when Plaintiff voluntarily parted with the stock certificate 
and delivered the stock power to Defendant. Plaintiff claims she 
can use parole evidence and extrinsic evidence to prove a contract 
or pledge agreement. However, even under the Plaintiff's theories 
the statute of limitations for the recovery of personal property 
commenced to run no later than November 8, 1988. Plaintiff's cause 
of action arose in Texas where Defendant and the certificate were 
located. This action is barred under the two-year Texas statute3, 
the three-year Utah statute4 or a one-year Louisiana statute5. 
Analysis Issue 4 
The fourth issue is whether or not the exception in 78-12-45 
UCA of the Utah Statute applies to Plaintiff. The statute states 
that a Plaintiff cannot maintain an action in the State of Utah 
when the cause of action has arisen in another state or territory 
and is barred in that state. The statute excepts a situation where 
a person has been a citizen of this state and who has held the 
cause of action from the time it accrued. The case of Allen v. 
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978) addressed the issue 
3
 Addendum A Appellant's Brief - Texas. 
4
 Addendum A Appellant's Brief - Utah. 
5
 Addendum A Appellant's Brief - Louisiana. 
and the Court said: 
"The more reasonable interpretation of the 
exclusive language of the statute is that it 
affords the protection of Utah Law only to its 
residents who incur causes of action while 
outside this state. Such an interpretation 
serves the legitimate purposes of protecting a 
limited class (Utah residents) as of the date 
their cause of action arises although they 
have since chosen a new state of residence. 
Most importantly, it does no violence to the 
(borrowing statute) which stands on the books 
for the purpose of preserving the worthwhile 
concepts of comity". 
Plaintiff brought this cause of action into Utah from 
elsewhere. Defendant has no contacts with the State of Utah nor is 
he a resident of the State of Utah. If the cause of action accrued 
when Plaintiff claims she was entitled to the return of her stock 
on November 8, 1988, her cause of action is clearly against the 
Defendant in the State of Texas. Plaintiff is not a citizen of 
Utah who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued as 
required by the exception found in the Utah Statute6. 
Plaintiff delayed the commencement of this action from October 
7, 1987 to the 3rd day of January, 1992, a period of approximately 
five years. The Plaintiff alleges neither fraud nor 
misrepresentation yet seeks the return of 32,190 shares of 
corporate stock. Defendant contends the statute of limitations 
started to run at the time of the delivery of the stock on October 
7, 1987. Plaintiff, on the other hand, by affidavit, claims her 
right of action started when Digitran issued 40,192 shares of its 
stock to Gary Briggs on November 8, 1988. Either way the Plaintiff 
has failed to timely bring this action whether the court applies 
the Utah, Texas or Louisiana Statute of Limitations. 
No Allegation of citizenship exists in the record. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF CLAIMS THE DEFENDANT HAS NO TENABLE BASIS ON 
WHICH TO ASSERT A BAR TO THE INTRODUCTION OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. 
The Trial Court erred in granting the summary judgment by 
considering evidence in violation of the parole evidence rule. As 
cited in the Defendant-Appellant's Brief parole evidence is only 
available to the Plaintiff when the Plaintiff demonstrates that the 
agreement between the parties is ambiguous. 
The Plaintiff asks this Court to literally discard the parole 
evidence rule and accept the uncorroborated testimony of Plaintiff 
to prove what she claims to be a pledge agreement between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant. 
The Plaintiff then proffers to the court a document (Ex. 34) 
authored solely by the Plaintiff which has no nexus or connection 
with the Defendant. It's authenticity is not proved nor admitted 
by the Defendant. The Plaintiff would have this Court find that 
there is a conditional pledge agreement between the Plaintiff and 
Defendant based upon the Plaintiff's affidavit and Ex. 34. The 
parole evidence rule and the statute of frauds bar Plaintiff's 
ability to prove any other agreement between the parties other than 
the unconditional delivery of stock coupled with an irrevocable 
stock power for its transfer. Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. 
Const., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF CLAIMS THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IS 
SOUND AND IS BASED UPON UNDISPUTED FACTS IN THE RECORD. 
Summary Judgment must be based upon competent admissible 
evidence not in violation of the parole evidence rule, the statute 
of frauds, and not creating a contested issue of fact. Plaintiff 
cites discoverable evidence as a grounds for justifying the courts 
granting of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff and 
the Trial Court erred. In Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 
1983) and Rainford v. Rvttinq. 22 Utah 2d 252 451 P.2d 769 (Utah 
1969), the Supreme Court struck an affidavit consisting of 
inadmissible parole evidence submitted for the purpose of varying 
the terms of a written agreement. 
Plaintiff relies solely on inadmissible testimony to attempt 
to prove an agreement between the parties. Lastly should this 
court find that the parole evidence rule nonetheless allows the 
admission of the conditions in evidence, the Trial Court ignored 
the issue of the payment of royalties which was a further 
condition. Creation of a material issue of fact requires a trial. 
The Trial Court and Plaintiff completely ignores the issue of 
the payment of royalties as a further condition for the retaining 
of the stock. However, the bottom line is that the stock 
transferred by the Plaintiff to the Defendant was irrevocable and 
was concluded on the date of the transfer as of October 7, 1987. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF CLAIMS THE TRIAL COURTS RULING NOT TO JOIN 
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, 
Should this Court determine that the unconditional stock power 
is ambiguous and allows parole and extrinsic evidence to prove a 
conditional delivery by the Plaintiff of the 32,190 shares of stock 
to the Defendant, then it is obvious that other parties are 
involved, such as the corporation whose obligation is to issue to 
the Defendant stock under the terms of the agreement to prepay 
Class A or Class B notes (see Exhibit 4) • Also the same 
corporation has the obligation to pay royalties to the general 
partner of the limited partnership. This would then require the 
inclusion of the general partner in the limited partnership to be 
present in court for the determination of the issue as to receipt 
and payment of royalties. The inclusion of these parties is not 
difficult because the Plaintiff is the President of Digitran, Inc. 
and is the major shareholder of the corporation which is the 
general partner of the limited partnership. Therefore, the only 
way a complete determination of the issues raised is to have before 
the court all parties interested in the transaction. The Utah 
Statutes cited by the Defendant in Defendant's Brief authorize just 
this sort of litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff would like this Court to believe that the 
Defendant is an opportunist who having received 32,190 shares of 
the Plaintiff's shares of stock of Digitran Inc. from Plaintiff, 
now refuses to return the stock to Plaintiff. The Defendant claims 
there are other unsolved issues such as the payment of royalties. 
As a practical matter this case is easily resolved by the obvious 
determination that the Plaintiff's action is barred by the Statute 
of Limitations in any state including the State of Utah where 
Plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property. 
If this case is not resolved by the Statute of Limitations 
this Court must then examine closely the contested evidence by 
which Plaintiff seeks to prove a conditional delivery of stock or 
a pledge agreement and then determine whether or not the 
conditional delivery and pledge agreement are proved by competent 
admissible evidence or whether the Parole Evidence Rule and Statute 
of Frauds, in the absence of any allegation of fraud or 
misrepresentation precludes the use of such non-evidence. If the 
Court thereafter concludes that notwithstanding there is a pledge 
or conditional delivery, the court must then determine whether or 
not additional parties should be brought in relative to royalties 
and send the matter back to the District Court for trial. 
The Defendant urges this Court to reverse the Trial Court on 
the issues of the Statute of Limitations and to dismiss Plaintiffs 
action. 
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